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ILLINOIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: REDEFINING THE
SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE DEFENSE
Kristina M Lau*
I. INTRODUCTION
Illinois tort law has long provided a mechanism for defendants to
contest and fully refute allegations of negligence. If successfully argued,
the sole proximate cause defense has the effect of absolving the defendant
of all liability. The exact parameters of who, when, and how the defense is
employed is constantly evolving. In recent years, the doctrine of sole
proximate cause has received generous attention from the Illinois appellate
courts and the Illinois Supreme Court. Such recent case law suggests the
defense is alive and well; however, it also raises pertinent concerns
regarding its changing scope and availability. Moreover, these concerns
have a profound effect on medical malpractice actions, which confront
distinct challenges from general negligence cases.
Sole proximate cause, commonly known as the "empty chair
defense," is a widely recognized concept. However, there is still ample
confusion between bench and bar regarding the proper scope of its
applicability. The following note examines the doctrine of sole proximate
cause within the context of medical malpractice litigation in Illinois.
Specifically, the note traces how sole proximate cause has evolved through
relevant case law and subsequently analyzes who, when, and how
defendants may present and argue the defense and receive the
accompanying jury instructions. This author contends that the scope of
sole proximate cause has grown even more favorable to defendants, so as
to present a unique challenge for plaintiffs alleging medical malpractice
and/or negligence. In such actions, the plaintiff must establish the proper
standard of care to assess the defendant's conduct, determine whether
there was a negligent breach of the standard of care, and show that the
resulting injury was proximately caused by the defendant's lack of skill or
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due care.' For purposes of this note, the discussion will exclusively focus
on how sole proximate cause relates to proximate causation. First, this
note introduces the plaintiff's burden of proving proximate cause; second,
the defendant's right to raise the sole proximate cause defense; and third,
the recent case law and the associated implications on the viability and
applicability of the sole proximate cause defense.
II. BACKGROUND: PLAINTIFF'S BURDEN OF PROVING
PROXIMATE CAUSE
Prior to examining the sole proximate cause defense, it is important
to understand the plaintiffs burden to show proximate causation. While
proximate cause may be simple to establish in a two-party accident,
medical malpractice cases often present a more unique challenge. In such
cases, establishing that the defendant's negligence was the proximate
cause of the plaintiffs injury becomes muddled and confounded by the
preexisting condition of the plaintiff. Specifically, in a medical
malpractice action, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the
defendant's breach of the applicable standard of care proximately caused
the injuries at issue.2
Plaintiff attorneys may also consider weaving a loss of chance or
worsened outcome theory into their proximate cause analysis. In this
context, plaintiffs may pursue one of four theories. Here, the ultimate
question asks "whether medical providers have negligently deprived the
plaintiff of a chance to survive or recover from a health problem or,
though their malpractice, have lessened the effectiveness of treatment or
increased the risk of an unfavorable outcome to the plaintiff."' While
Illinois courts have teetered between requiring and not requiring plaintiffs
to prove a better result, the court affirmed this requirement in Johnson v.
Loyola University Medical Center in 2008.4
Proximate causation must be established through expert testimony to
a reasonable degree of medical certainty and cannot be "contingent,
speculative, or merely possible."' Moreover, although the plaintiff is not
required to present unequivocal evidence of causation, he or she can meet
one's burden of proof by introducing circumstantial evidence from which
1. Higgens v. House, 680 N.E.2d 1089, 1092 (1ll. App. Ct. 1997).
2. Reardon v. Bonutti Orthopaedic Servs., Ltd., 737 N.E.2d 309, 317-18 (111. App. Ct. 2000).
3. Terrence J. Lavin & Kristina M. Lau, Proving Proximate Cause in Malpractice Cases, 97 ILL. B.J. 254,
254 (2009) (citing Holton v. Mem'1 Hosp., 679 N.E.2d 1202, 1207 (Ill. 1997)).
4. Johnson v. Loyola Univ. Med. Ctr., 893 N.E.2d 267, 272-73 (lll. App. Ct. 2008).
5. Id. at 272.
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a jury can make all reasonable inferences.'
There are two parts to proving causation; namely, cause in fact and
legal causation.! Cause in fact requires the plaintiff to show that a
defendant's negligence was more probably than not an actual cause of his
or her injury.' Courts commonly subscribe to one of two tests to
determine the existence of cause in fact: the traditional "but for" test,
which maintains, "a defendant's conduct is not a cause of an event if the
event would have occurred without it."; and, alternatively, the "substantial
factor" test, which maintains, "the defendant's conduct is said to be a
cause of an event if it was a material element and a substantial factor in
bringing the event about."9 Legal causation moves the analysis one step
further. It specifically requires that the injury be "a natural and probable
result of the negligent act or omissions, and be of such a character as an
ordinary prudent person ought to have foreseen as likely to occur as a
result of negligence. Although, it is not essential that the person charged
with negligence should have foreseen the precise injury which resulted
from his act.""
Finally, it is significant to note that an injury may have more than one
proximate cause. "If the defendant was negligent, his negligence does not
need to be the sole cause of plaintiffs injury; it is enough if the
defendant's negligence is one of many causes."" Thus, an actor is liable
for his negligent conduct whether he contributed in whole or in part to the
injury.' 2 Accordingly, it is not a defense that someone or something else
also contributed to the injury."
6. Cummings v. Jha, 915 N.E.2d 908, 922 (111. App. Ct. 2009) (citing Bergman v. Kelsey, 873 N.E.2d 486,
500 (lll. App. Ct. 2007)).
7. Lee v. Chi. Transit Auth., 605 N.E.2d 493, 502 (111. 1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 908 (1993).
8. Johnson, 893 N.E.2d at 272.
9. Nolan v. Weil-McLain, 910 N.E.2d 549, 557 (111. 2009) (quoting Thacker v. UNR Indus., Inc., 603
N.E.2d 449, 455 (111. 1992)).
10. Williams v. Univ. of Chi. Hosp., 179 Ill. 2d 80, 87 (1997), see also Holton v. Mem'1 Hosp., 176 Ill. 2d
95, 107 (1997).
11. John G. Phillips, The Sole Proximate Cause "Defense": A Misfit in the World of Contribution and
Comparative Negligence, 22 S. ILL. U. L. J. 1, 1 (1997).
12. Thompson v. Gordon, 398 Ill. App. 3d 538, 550 (2009).
13. Id.
3892011]
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III. BACKGROUND: DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO RAISE THE
SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE DEFENSE
A. General
The purpose of the sole proximate cause defense is to provide the
defendant with a mechanism to defeat a plaintiff's claim of negligence by
establishing proximate causation in the act of another person or entity. 4
While it is not a defense that another party's negligence also caused the
harm, it is a defense when conduct independent of the defendant entirely
caused the harm." The sole proximate cause defense may be raised
"where there is some competent evidence that the sole proximate cause of
a plaintiffs claimed injury lies in the conduct of someone other than the
defendant."'" The defendant may point to another party or an "empty
chair" without offering expert testimony that criticizes the care of the
uninvolved party." Moreover, the defendant may argue in closing that
another party caused the injury, notwithstanding the absence of evidence
tending to establish that the party's conduct was negligent. To this extent,
the defendant is entitled the sole proximate cause jury instruction provided
there is "some competent evidence" that something external to the
defendant's conduct was the sole cause of injury."
B. Procedure and Pleading
The First District in Robinson v. Boffa appropriately explained:
The defendant is not required to plead lack of proximate cause
as an affirmative defense. However, 'if there is evidence that
negates causation, defendant should show it.' A defendant has
the right to rebut evidence tending to show that his acts are
negligent and a proximate cause of the plaintiffs injuries and he
has the related right to establish that some other causative factor
was the sole proximate cause of the injuries . . ..
From a procedural standpoint, answering the plaintiffs complaint
with a general denial of liability is sufficient to present evidence that the
14. McDonnell v. McPartlin, 192 Ill. 2d 505, 516 (2000).
15. Ellig v. Delnor Cmty. Hosp., 237 Ill. App. 3d 396, 405 (2nd Dist. 1992).
16. IPI CIVIL 3D No. 12.04; see also Nassar v. County of Cook, 333 Ill. App. 2d 289, 297 (1st Dist. 2002).
17. McDonnell, 192 111. 2d at 519-523.
18. McDonnell, 192 Ill. 2d at 520.
19. Robinson v. Boffa, 930 N.E.2d 1087, 1094 (lll. App. Ct. I Dist. 2010) (internal citation omitted).
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injury was the result of another person or cause.20 Accordingly, the
defendant has no additional requirement to plead sole proximate cause as
an affirmative defense. 2 ' Recall, "[w]here there is some competent
evidence that the sole proximate cause of a plaintiffs claimed injury lies
in the conduct of someone other than the defendant, the defendant is
entitled to have the jury instructed [on sole proximate cause],
notwithstanding the absence of evidence tending to establish that the third
person's conduct was negligent." 22
A sole proximate cause instruction, like any jury instruction, requires
that there be some evidence to support its theory and use. There are two
forms of jury pattern instructions used in these cases. First, a pattern
instruction on sole proximate cause applies where there is evidence that
someone other than the defendant is the sole proximate cause of the
plaintiff's injury. Illinois Pattern Instruction (IPI) 12.04 titled "concurrent
negligence other than defendant's" instructs the jury:
More than one person may be to blame for causing an injury.
If you decide that a [the] defendant[s] was [were] negligent and
that his [their] negligence was a proximate cause of injury to the
Plaintiff, it is not a defense that some third person who is not a
party to the suit may also have been to blame.
However, if you decide that the sole proximate cause of injury
to the Plaintiff was the conduct of some person other than the
defendant, then your verdict should be for the defendant. 23
Alternatively, a pattern instruction on negligence, through the
intervention of an outside agency, applies where there is evidence that
something other than the defendant's conduct is the sole proximate cause
of the plaintiffs injury. IPI 12.05, titled "negligence- intervention of
outside agency," instructs the jury:
If you decide that a [the] defendant[s] was [were] negligent
and that his [their] negligence was a proximate cause of injury
to the Plaintiff, it is not a defense that something else may also
have been a cause of the injury.
20. McDonnell, 736 N.E.2d at 1084.
2 1. Id.
22. Id. at 1085.
23. IPICIVIL3DNo. 12.04.
2011] 391
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However, if you decide that the sole proximate cause of injury
to the Plaintiff was something other than the conduct of the
defendant, then your verdict should be for the defendant. 24
As expressed in the second paragraphs of IPI 12.04 and 12.05, the
jury may consider the sole proximate cause defense only if tendered the
long form instruction. In comparison to the standard of proof required for
a long form IPI 12.04 instruction, a long form IPI 12.05 instruction
requires less from the defendant. As illustrated in Robinson, the First
Appellate District approved a sole proximate cause jury instruction,
provided the defendant point to any other medical condition that may have
been the cause of plaintiff s injuries.25
C. Evolution of Sole Proximate Cause in Illinois
Sole proximate cause is not a new concept or theory. As explained
by former President of the Illinois Trial Lawyers John Phillips,
"Historically, the idea of 'sole proximate cause' or 'sole cause,' appeared
in Illinois cases as early as 1901."26 Despite its longstanding origins,
however, the history of sole proximate cause has not been
comprehensively examined.27 Mr. Phillips further explains that Illinois
courts have often intertwined and confused the concepts of sole cause and
superseding cause.28 While the origins and evolution of sole proximate
cause are not clear, the courts have addressed the scope and applicability
of the defense time and time again. The following section traces the
evolution of sole proximate cause through the courts.
In Leonardi v. Loyola University of Chicago, the Illinois Supreme
Court examined the appropriate circumstances where defendants were
entitled to present evidence that a nonparty physician was solely liable for
harm to the patient. In Leonardi, the estate of a deceased patient brought a
medical malpractice suit against the decedent's hospital and physicians
following an emergency pulmonary embolectomy that resulted in
irreversible brain damage to the patient.2 9 In ruling on the admissibility of
evidence relating to the defendant's sole proximate cause argument, the
supreme court noted that "[t]he sole proximate cause defense merely
24. IPI CIvIL 3D No. 12.05.
25. Robinson, 930 N.E.2d at 1094.
26. Phillips, supra note 11, at 4.
27. Id. at 5 (explaining that resources such as the Restatement of Torts, law reviews, books, treatises, and
periodicals have failed to shed light on the origins, limitations and framework of "sole proximate cause").
28. Id.
29. Leonardi, 658 N.E. 2d at 454.
392
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focuses the attention of a properly instructed jury . .. on the plaintiffs
duty to prove that the defendant's conduct was a proximate cause of
plaintiffs injury."" In its opinion, the court stressed the defendant's right
to present a defense and rebut allegations of wrongdoing. "A defendant
has the right not only to rebut evidence tending to show that defendant's
acts are negligent and the proximate cause of claimed injuries, but also has
the right to endeavor to establish by competent evidence that the conduct
of a third person, or some other causative factor, is the sole proximate
cause of plaintiffs injuries." "
In Holton v. Memorial Hospital, the sole proximate cause instruction
was rejected because there was insufficient evidence to demonstrate that it
was only the negligence of persons other than the hospital employees that
proximately caused the plaintiffs' injuries.32 In Holton, the plaintiffs
sought damages arising from Patricia Holton's personal injuries, allegedly
caused by the defendants' negligence.33 Following trial, the jury returned a
verdict in favor of the plaintiffs, and the appellate court affirmed.34 The
defendants appealed, arguing the court erred by excluding the long form
jury instruction 12.04, which would have instructed the jury on a sole
proximate cause provision based on the conduct of third parties." The
Supreme Court of Illinois rejected the defendants' contention on the basis
that they failed to present evidence that it was only the negligence of
persons other than the hospital employees that proximately caused
plaintiffs injury." Additionally, the defendants erred in attempting to
establish that no medical negligence occurred at all." The Supreme Court
of Illinois revisited the language posed in Leonardi, which stressed that a
sole proximate cause instruction was proper if there was competent
evidence that another person or condition was the sole proximate cause of
plaintiffs injury." The court further reasoned, "[a] defendant is not
automatically entitled to a sole proximate cause instruction wherever there
is evidence that there may have been more than one, or concurrent, causes
of an injury or where more than one person may have been negligent.
Instead, a sole proximate cause instruction is not appropriate unless there
30. Id. at 456.
31. Id. at 459.
32. Holton v. Mem'1 Hosp., 176 Ill. 2d 95, 134 (1997).
33. Id. at 99.
34. Id. at 103.
35. Id. at 133.
36. Id. at 134.
37. Id.
38. Id.
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is evidence that the sole proximate cause (not "a" proximate cause) of a
plaintiffs injury is conduct of another person or condition." 39  The
outcome of Holton was premised on the complete absence of evidence that
someone or something other than the defendant was the sole proximate
cause of the plaintiffs injuries. Thus, pursuant to Holton, it is insufficient
to present evidence that shows someone or something other than the
defendant was a contributing cause to the plaintiffs' injuries. Holton
unequivocally required the defendant to present evidence tending to show
sole or only causation, to be afforded the defense and accompanying jury
instruction.
McDonnell v. McPartlin took the sole proximate cause inquiry one
step further by distinguishing between the long form jury instructions, IPI
12.04 and 12.05. Specifically, the McDonnell court addressed whether a
defendant in a medical negligence case, who points to the conduct of a
nonparty physician as the sole proximate cause of plaintiffs injury, must
demonstrate that the nonparty physician's conduct was professionally
negligent, as well as the sole proximate cause of plaintiffs injury.40 In
McDonnell, the plaintiff, executrix of her husband's estate, filed a
wrongful death and survival action against his doctors and their corporate
employers.4 1 Plaintiff alleged the defendants were medically negligent in
failing to diagnose and treat her husband's hip infection that ultimately
resulted in his death. 42 Defendants denied any liability, arguing a nonparty
was the sole proximate cause of his death. 43  The trial court entered
judgment following a jury verdict in favor of defendants, and the appellate
court affirmed.44 On appeal, plaintiff contended the court erred by
instructing the jury on the sole proximate cause instruction." The supreme
court disagreed with the plaintiffs contention and held that "in the context
of a medical negligence case, the sole proximate cause instruction requires
only that the defendant present some evidence that the nondefendant was
the sole proximate cause of the plaintiffs injury. It is not necessary that
the defendant also establish that the nondefendant's conduct was medically
negligent." 46 Deferring to the plain language of IPI No. 12.04, the court
stressed that the instruction refers only to the "conduct of some person
39. Id
40. McDonnell, 736 N.E.2d at 1079.





46. McDonnell, 192 Ill. 2d at 516.
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other than the defendant, not the negligent conduct of some person other
than the defendant."4 7 Furthermore, the "Notes on Use" accompanying the
instruction similarly explained that "[t]he second paragraph should be used
only where there is evidence tending to show that the sole proximate cause
of the occurrence was the conduct of a third person, not the negligent
conduct of a third person."48 The court determined there was no explicit
requirement that the jury should consider whether the nonparty's conduct
was negligent.
Although outside of the medical malpractice context, Nolan v. Weil-
McLain is instructive because it gives rise to the "dual sole proximate
cause defense."4 9 In Nolan, plaintiff, as executrix of the decedent's estate,
sought recovery for the wrongful death of her husband." Plaintiff alleged
that the decedent developed mesothelioma, an asbestos-related cancer,
after being negligently exposed to defendant's asbestos-containing
products."' All of the defendants except for Weil-McLain settled or were
dismissed prior to trial.52 The trial court granted plaintiffs motion in
limine barring the defendant from introducing evidence of the decedent's
other asbestos-related exposures by nonparty entities." Following trial,
the jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, and the appellate court
affirmed.54 On appeal, the supreme court reversed, finding that Weil-
McLain should have been permitted to present evidence to establish that
the conduct of another entity was the sole proximate cause of the
decedent's injury." By excluding such evidence, the trial court improperly
prevented the defendant from presenting a sole proximate cause defense,
thus making the case "undefendable" for defendant." "Our case law,
properly interpreted, stands for the proposition that the jury must be
allowed to sort through competent-and likely conflicting-evidence so that
it can fairly resolve whether exposure to a particular product was the
proximate cause of injury.""
47. Id. at 517 (emphasis added).
48. Id. at 518.
49. Lindsay Brown, Dual Sole Proximate Causes: Asserting an Effective Oxymoronic Defense, 20 IDC
QUARTERLY, MONTH 2010, at 1, 22 (The author defined dual sole proximate cause as, "[A] defense
strategy wherein a defendant alleges that two entirely separate individuals, entities, or things are each solely
to blame for the plaintiffs injury.).
50. Nolan, 233 Ill. 2d at 418.
51. Id. at 419.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 419.
54. Id. at 418.
55. Id. at 445.
56. Id.
57. Nolan, 233 Ill. 2d at 445.
2011] 395
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More recently, the Illinois Supreme Court addressed how to apply the
sole proximate cause defense in regards to a settled defendant. While also
outside of the medical malpractice context, Ready v. United/Goedecke
Services is instructive because the court was compelled to address two
relevant inquiries associated with raising the sole proximate cause defense.
First, Ready addressed how courts should construe the statutory language
of joint tortfeasor liability. Second, Ready considered whether it was
proper to exclude evidence offered to show that the sole proximate cause
of plaintiffs injuries stemmed from the conduct of settling defendants. In
Ready, the decedent was killed in an accident at the power plant, where he
worked, after a scaffolding truss fell and struck him in the shoulder."
Plaintiff, the executrix of decedent's estate, filed a wrongful death claim
against the general contractor, the subcontractor, and the decedent's
employer." The plaintiff settled her claims against the employer and the
general contractor, and proceeded to trial against the subcontractor
(United).60
The trial court ruled in a pretrial motion that United would not be
allowed to present any evidence regarding the conduct of the settling
defendants.6' Additionally, the trial court denied United's requested sole
proximate cause jury instruction form, effectively excluding the contractor
and employer from the verdict form.62 The jury returned a verdict in the
plaintiffs favor, and the trial court entered judgment accordingly."
United appealed, arguing the trial court had erred in excluding evidence
regarding the conduct of the general contractor and employer as the sole
proximate of the accident, and in refusing its sole proximate cause jury
instruction." The appellate court affirmed in part and reversed in part, and
remanded for a reapportioning of fault, finding that the general contractor
and employer should have been on the verdict form.65 The supreme court
subsequently reversed the appellate court's holding because Section 2-
1117, unequivocally, does not permit apportioning of fault to settling
defendants." Moreover, because the appellate court never addressed the
sole proximate cause issue, the Illinois Supreme Court remanded the case
58. Ready v. United/ Goedecke Services, Inc., 238 Ill. 2d 582, 584 (2010).
59. Id. at 584-85.
60. Id. at 585.
61. Id. at 585-86.
62. Id. at 587.
63. Id.





again to address "United's concern that it was deprived of a sole proximate
cause defense when the trial court refused its request for an instruction on
sole proximate cause."6 7  On remand, the First Appellate District
determined the trial court abused its discretion in excluding evidence of
the settling defendants' conduct.68 Before the case could be returned to the
trial court, the Supreme Court granted plaintiffs petition for leave to
appeal.
Revisiting the court's decision in Nolan and the language in
Leonardi, the Supreme Court agreed that the trial court erred in excluding
evidence that would have supported the defendant's sole proximate cause
defense." Having decided that the trial court erred, the Supreme Court
was tasked to determine whether the error was "harmless."o The court
concluded it was, and "that even a properly instructed jury would not have
reached a different verdict because there was significant evidence that
United was a proximate cause of the accident.",7
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Effect of Ready
The outcome of Ready is significant because it has profound
implications for determining comparative negligence of multiple
defendants and how evidence of settling defendants may be used in
advancing the sole proximate cause defense. It was important for the court
to address which parties constituted a "defendant sued by the plaintiff'
under Section 2-1117 of the Illinois Joint Liability Act because it redefined
who defendants could point to in advancing the sole proximate cause
defense. Prior to the court's holding in Ready, a "defendant sued by the
plaintiff' could have been interpreted to include all original parties or the
remaining parties following pre-trial settlements. Following Ready, a
settling defendant would not be considered a "defendant sued by the
plaintiff." As a nonparty, evidence offered to show sole proximate cause
in the conduct of a settling defendant could still be presented at trial.
The Ready court also determined that where there was significant
evidence to show the defendant was a proximate cause of the injury,
67. Id.
68. Id. at 588.
69. Id. at 590.
70. Id. at 592.
71. Id.
3972011]
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evidence of another party's negligent conduct was not admissible because
no reasonable jury could conclude that another party's negligent conduct
was the sole proximate cause of injury.72 Here, the court appropriately
suggests that if the manifest weight of the evidence infers that the
defendant is liable for the plaintiffs injuries, it would be improper to cast
blame on a third party or entity.
Ready further suggests that the sole proximate cause defense is alive
and well in Illinois. Notwithstanding whether the "empty chair" was a
settling defendant or a nonparty, Ready confirms that there is at least one
avenue for defendants to introduce evidence of such negligence."
However, having resolved the aforementioned issues, the Ready decision
leaves audiences wanting for further clarification. By definition, a
defendant that raises a sole proximate cause defense points to a separate
person, an entity, or a factor that proximately caused the plaintiffs alleged
injury. Although the Ready court did not expressly indicate that a
defendant may point to more than one sole proximate cause, its holding
suggests that defendants may do so. Specifically, the court held the
defendant should have been permitted to present evidence of the general
contractor's conduct and the employer's conduct. This is significant for
two reasons: first, it intuitively contradicts what sole proximate cause
intends to accomplish. Second, it has the effect of expanding the scope
and availability of the sole proximate cause defense.
B. Is Ready Inconsistent with the Sole Proximate Cause Doctrine?
Recall, in Illinois, a sole proximate cause instruction is only proper
when there is evidence that the sole proximate cause of a plaintiffs injury
is conduct of another person or condition. Accordingly, evidence cannot
point to a proximate cause, but the sole proximate cause of injury.
Borrowing from the court's reasoning in Holton, it would be improper to
permit evidence of more than one entity's conduct in raising a sole
proximate cause defense. Leonardi and Holton stress that defendants
wishing to advance the defense should point to only one alternative cause.
Specifically in the medical malpractice context, the First Appellate District
has found that the sole proximate cause instruction was improper where
the defendant presented evidence of "multifactorial" causes of death.74
Contrary to these rules guiding the applicability of sole proximate cause,
72. Id. at 582.
73. David Sethi, The "Empty Chair"/ Sole Proximate Cause Defense is Alive and Well in Illinois, March
17, 2011, available at http://wmlaw.com/_file/articles/THE%20EMPTY%20CHAIR.pdf.
74. Clayton v. Cook, 346 Ill. App. 3d 367 (1st Dist. 2004).
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the court in Ready suggests the defense is not necessarily limited to one
entity or nonparty. Alternatively, the court seemingly approves the
defendant's strategy that two separate entities were each solely to blame
for decedent's untimely death.
From a purely mechanical perspective, the word "sole" indicates a
singular entity. Synonyms of the word "sole" include adjectives such as:
"one," "only," and "single."" In effect, "the addition of the word 'sole'
only emphasizes the single nature of the direct cause of an event."" It is
arguably misleading to employ the sole proximate cause defense when the
defendant may point to more than one probable cause of injury.
C. How are these Incongruities Reconciled?
In the last few years, Illinois courts have shown a greater willingness
to permit evidence offered to show that the "sole" proximate cause of
injury was the result of more than one cause. As illustrated in Nolan, the
Illinois Supreme Court affirmatively held that the defendant should have
been permitted to present evidence that the "sole" proximate cause of the
decedent's death was his exposure to the asbestos-containing products of
eleven separate nonparty entities. Revisiting the language in Holton and
Leonardi, the Nolan court did not focus on the number of other "sole"
possible causes, but rather on the availability of pointing to some other
cause(s).
Most recently, the Illinois appellate court returned to the medical
malpractice context and addressed this precise question- whether a
defendant may point to more than one "sole" proximate cause? In
Robinson v. Boffa, the court expressly approved of this strategy. In
Robinson, Ms. Boone underwent surgery to remove a cancerous tumor
from her colon." After failing to remove the tumor in the first surgery, the
surgeon performed a second surgery five days later." Ms. Boone passed
away shortly thereafter.79 Decedent's estate sued the surgeon for medical
malpractice, claiming that he violated the applicable standard of care by
failing to remove the cancerous tumor during the first surgery." At trial,
the defendant presented evidence to support two distinct sole proximate
75. Merriam-Webster Online Thesaurus. "sole," Mar, 20, 2011, available at http://www.merriam-
webster.com/thesaurus/sole.
76. Phillips, supra note II at 6 (citing Crouch v. Nicholson, 156 S.E. 2d 384, 386 (Ga. App. Ct. 1967).
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cause theories. First, that the proximate cause of the decedent's death was
multisystem failure, secondary to her general poor health; and second, the
gastroenterologist's negligence in failing to locate the cancerous tumor in
his colonoscopy report." The jury found in favor of the defendant and the
court entered judgment accordingly. Subsequently, the plaintiff appealed
on two grounds. First, she contended there was insufficient evidence to
support the sole proximate cause theories raised at trial, and second, that
the court committed a reversible error by tendering the long form sole
proximate cause instructions to the jury. 82
On appeal, the court addressed each of defendant's sole proximate
cause defenses. First, the court found that tendering the long form of IPI
12.05 was proper." The Robinson court reasoned there was sufficient
evidence presented at trial to support the defendant's argument that
decedent's demise was caused by her preexisting medical condition.84 In
support, the court cited McDonnell for the proposition that a defendant is
entitled to the long form sole proximate cause jury instruction so long as
there is "some competent evidence" to support that defense.85 Having
reached this conclusion, the court found the trial court erred in tendering
the long form IPI 12.04 because there was no evidentiary basis to support
the defendant's second sole proximate cause defense." Specifically, the
court rejected the defendant's assertion that the decedent's death resulted
from the nonparty gastroenterologist's failure to properly locate the tumor.
While the court recognized this error, the plaintiff failed to show she was
prejudiced by the instructional error." Accordingly, the trial court's
holding was affirmed."
Robinson effectively expands the scope and understanding of the sole
proximate cause defense. The ruling stands for the proposition that a
defendant may point to more than one "sole" proximate cause in raising
the defense. For defendants, the required evidentiary threshold is rather
low. Pursuant to McDonnell, the defendant only has to present "some
evidence" that the nonparty was the sole proximate cause of the plaintiffs
injury to be entitled to the long form jury instruction. Furthermore, that
defendant is not required to establish that the nonparty's conduct was
81. Id. at 1090.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1094.
84. Id.
85. Id. (citing McDonnell v. McPartlin, 192 lil. 2d 505, 521 (2000)).
86. Id. at 1092.
87. Id. at 1093-94.
88. Id. at 1094.
400
ILLINOIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
medically negligent. In support of these rules, the Supreme Court of
Illinois has continually upheld its holding in Leonardi, stressing that every
defendant has the right to present a defense. The "Notes on Use" for the
Illinois Jury Pattern Instructions further bolsters the case law. For
instance, Leonardi instructs that the long form sole proximate cause
instruction, IPI 12.04 "should be given where there is evidence, albeit
slight and unpersuasive, tending to show that the sole proximate cause of
the accident was the conduct of a party other than the defendant.""
Moreover, as affirmed by the court in Ready, a defendant is entitled to
present evidence regarding conduct of settling defendants, as long as it
relates to his sole proximate cause defense.90
Following Ready and Robinson, defendants may be able to contest
proximate causation with greater ease. Without the burden of proving a
nonparty's negligence, and the availability of pointing to more than one
"sole" proximate cause, a defendant is more inclined to successfully argue
a sole proximate cause defense. This is particularly disconcerting in the
medical malpractice context. As Robinson instructs, pointing to a
preexisting condition may be sufficient to defeat proximate causation, and
hence, liability. According to the First Appellate District, the defendant
may "throw out" any other medical condition that may be the cause of
plaintiffs injury to be entitled to the instruction:
Plaintiff argues 'it is not enough to simply throw out a medical
condition and allow the jury to determine whether there is a
casual relationship between that condition and the claimed
injury.' Again, we must disagree with plaintiff."
Although the effect of Robinson has yet to be seen, this language may
have far-reaching consequences for medical malpractice litigation.
Specifically, it poses a unique challenge for plaintiffs, especially those
litigating complex medical cases, because defendants may be better
equipped to contest liability by pointing to a pre-existing condition of the
plaintiffs. Moreover, as a result of Ready, plaintiffs may grow reluctant
to settle with less than all of the defendants prior to trial. The outcome of
Ready invites non-settling defendants to argue that the real and sole cause
of injury lies in a settling defendant.
89. Ready, 939 N.E.2d 417, 422 (Ill. 2010) (citing Leonardi, 658 N.E. 2dat459).
90. Id. at 421-422 (emphasis added).
91. Robinson, 930 N.E.2d 1087, 1094 (1ll. App. Ct. 2010).
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D. The Sole Proximate Cause Defense Needs Future Refining
The sole proximate cause defense is a viable mechanism for
defendants to contest proximate causation in any negligence suit.
However, the scope and availability of the defense has grown to sweeping
allowances. In contrast with today's standard, Illinois courts should
reconsider the higher evidentiary requirement rejected in Freeman v.
Petroff92 In Freeman, the court reconsidered its holding in light of
Leonardi, finding there was sufficient evidence to support the defendant's
sole proximate cause defense. The Freeman court ultimately rejected
plaintiffs' contention that ". . .where the medical malpractice of a nonparty
is alleged, the defendant must establish through expert testimony the
generally accepted standard of care for the particular situation, a deviation
from that standard, and a causal connection between the nonparty's
deviation and the plaintiffs injury, in order to give the. . . [long form] IPI
12.04."" If Freeman was positive law today, any defendant alleging sole
proximate cause in another person or entity would be required to support
that allegation with expert testimony. This has the effect of equating the
defendant's burden of proof to the plaintiff s.94
Heightening the required evidentiary threshold for defendants who
raise a sole proximate cause defense may be advantageous in two ways.
First, it helps to mitigate the prejudicial imbalance caused by the sole
proximate cause defense. As the law stands today, the doctrine is rather
prejudicial to plaintiffs. Because defendants are not required to plead sole
proximate cause as an affirmative defense, defendants may interject a sole
cause argument at any time during trial. By doing so, the plaintiff is
forced to prove his case in chief, in addition to rebutting the defendant's
sole proximate cause defense." The lack of notice given to plaintiffs is
akin to undergoing trial by ambush. Reconsidering the proposition in
Freeman may help to balance the present inequities between plaintiffs and
defendants. Moreover, requiring a greater showing from the defendant
does not disturb the plaintiffs burden of proof. He or she still bears the
same burden; however, the plaintiff is better able to focus on establishing
the defendant's liability at trial, as opposed to rebutting the liability of
92. Freeman v. Petroff, 680 N.E.2d 453 (lll. App. Ct. 1997).
93. Id. at 459.
94. It is important to note, however, that the court has dismissed this proposition once before. As
expressed in Leonardi, "Obviously, if there is evidence that negates causation, a defendant should show it.
However, in granting the defendant the privilege of going forward, also called the burden of production, the
law no way shifts to the defendant the burden of proof." 658 N.E. 2d at 454.
95. Phillips, supra note 11, at 8.
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some other party or entity.
Second, heightening the evidentiary threshold promotes sound
judicial policy. Currently, the sole proximate cause defense equates to
finger-pointing. Attributing blame to nonparties and resurrecting evidence
that points to settling-defendants undermines the purpose of the justice
system. Similarly, the sole proximate cause defense encourages
defendants to cast blame on others in an attempt to avoid liability.
Narrowing the scope of the defense would help to focus the trial on the
primary inquiry at hand.
VI. CONCLUSION
Particularly in recent years, the sole proximate cause defense has
expanded considerably under Illinois tort law. This concern is further
exacerbated by the ease, in which the defense may be raised, and the
expanding scope and availability of who the defendant may point to.
While defendants should be afforded the right to present the sole
proximate cause defense, the process by which the defense is raised should
have appropriate limitations and guidelines. It has yet to be seen how
Ready and Robinson will affect the future of sole proximate cause in
Illinois. However, it is clear that the defense has grown more defendant-
friendly and prejudicial to plaintiffs in recent years. It will be for the
courts and legislature to address these growing concerns and doctrinal
limitations.
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